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Cooperatives in Transition. Studies of ownership during a merger 
Abstract 
The aim of this thesis was to explore the relations and perspectives that members 
have  on  the  cooperatives  they  patron.  Agricultural  cooperatives  in  the  Swedish 
tradition have often been multipurpose cooperatives, thus serving farmers with a 
heterogeneous  background.  For  this  to  be  successful,  it  has  been  important  to 
educate members and to develop the trust between members and other actors in the 
cooperative. In a merged cooperative, trust and heterogeneity may influence the 
uncertainty that the cooperative faces before the new organizational structure has 
been imposed. Thus the first paper in this thesis explores how trust among actors is 
developed  and  maintained  after  a  merger,  by  analyzing  the  role  member 
representatives has in mediating between members and managers. The second paper 
covers  how  heterogeneity  in  farmers’  backgrounds  may  influence  their 
heterogeneity in preferences for a reallocation of equity. The first paper shows that 
member representatives have a leadership authority that managers use for getting 
information  accepted  by  members.  The  second  paper  shows  that  members  in  a 
cooperative have different perspectives on the cooperative depending on whether 
they have a high level of investments or a high level of patronage. The conclusions 
of  the  two  papers  are  that  member  representatives  are  important  in  mediating 
information in a cooperative, possibly because of the face-to-face communication 
they have with both members and managers. And the different perspectives that 
members  have  on  their  cooperative  may  be  explained  by  the  heterogeneity  in 
preferences that they have.  
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1  Introduction 
When small-scale producers aim to trade their products, they sometimes 
realize that the best way to do this is to take control over the bargaining, 
marketing, and even processing of the products. For farmers, the solution 
has often been to form a cooperative, to overcome problems with buyers’ 
cartels,  marketing  to  consumers,  and  future  uncertainties.  With  the 
formation  of  cooperatives,  farmers  also  become  business  owners,  which 
brings both opportunities to profit from the business and the responsibility 
to finance it. Horizontal coordination and vertical integration thus move 
farmers into a new position in the market, from a buyer/seller position to a 
combined  buyer/seller  and  owner  position.  Thus,  the  relationships  the 
farmer  has  with  the  cooperative,  its  managers,  and  its  employees  have 
different characteristics from those the farmer would have with an investor-
owned  firm  owned  by  non-farmers.  These  characteristics  are  somewhat 
determined by the institutional arrangements that surround the operations 
(i.e.,  the  farmers  and  the  cooperatives),  but  also  by  the  purpose  of  the 
farmers’ involvement with their cooperative. A Danish cooperative differs 
from  a  Swedish  cooperative  and  a  consumer  cooperative  running  retail 
stores differs from a farmer’s cooperative processing grains into cereals and 
flour and marketing them to consumers.  
 
The  following  studies  were initiated out of interest in how members 
react to changes in the institutions surrounding the member–cooperative 
relationship. The first study focuses on the relationships between members, 
elected  member  representatives  (i.e.,  directors),  and  managers,  as  a  large 
number of cooperatives merged into a single cooperative while introducing 
sequences of new organizational structures. The second study concerns the 
ownership  and  residual  rights  to  the  cooperative,  since  a  jurisdictional 
change  let  the  cooperative  reallocate  previously  collective  equity  into   12
individually  allocated  equity.  The  common  theme  is  the  exploration  of 
responses to changes in interactions with the cooperative.  
 
This thesis explores ownership interactions between members and their 
cooperatives when there are changes in the settings surrounding them. Two 
studies were conducted, one exploring trust in a newly merged cooperative 
with,  for  members,  an  unfamiliar  organizational  structure,  and  another 
exploring member perception of investment issues in cooperatives in light 
of a jurisdictional change allowing for equity reallocation.  
 
1.1  Background 
 
For  over  a  century,  cooperatives  have  been  an  important  part  of  the 
agricultural  sector  for  Scandinavian  farmers  (Rydén,  2004,  Skurnik  & 
Vikriälä,  1999).  From  WWI  to  1990,  Swedish  agricultural  and  forest 
cooperatives  organized  to  negotiate  agricultural  policies  and  regulations 
with the state (Hakelius, 2002). In 1990, it was decided that the agricultural 
sector  would  undergo  a  five-year  transition  to  a  completely  unregulated 
condition, without any subsidies, quotas, or other interventions from the 
Swedish state. However, by the time these five years had elapsed, Sweden 
had  applied  for  membership  in  the  European  Union,  making  the 
agricultural sector once again part of a regulated market, albeit one with 
considerable  competition.  The  years  of  a  national,  protected  market  left 
farmers  and  their  cooperatives  inexperienced  in  handling  market 
competition. Some of the practices that farmers and their cooperatives had 
grown  accustomed  to  were  not  particularly  well  suited  for  a  more 
competitive  market  (Hakelius,  2002).  The  changes  in  agricultural  policy 
came fairly suddenly, leaving farmers and their cooperatives little time to 
prepare.  As  Hakelius  (2002)  and  Svensson  (1997)  have  demonstrated, 
managers  and  directors  of  cooperatives  had  unrealistic  expectations 
regarding the level of investment necessary for Swedish cooperatives to gain 
shares in a larger market.  
 
It has also been pointed out that, since the main stakeholder in these 
cooperatives at the end of the twentieth century was the state, cooperatives 
had become oriented towards bureaucratic management, instead of being 
market  oriented  (Nilsson  &  Björklund,  2003).  This  was  a  result  of  the 
agricultural policy after WWII, when the political focus was that Sweden   13
should be self-sufficient in food and agricultural cooperatives became the 
executors of the agricultural policy. The agricultural policy was determined 
via  settlements  involving  most  political  parties  and  representatives  of the 
cooperatives  (notably,  cooperatives  were  members  of  the  special  interest 
organization  for  the  agricultural  sector,  whereas  investor-owned  firms—
IOFs—were  excluded)  (Johansson,  1994).  Consequently,  legislation 
concerning  cooperatives  was  sometimes  more  influenced  by  ideological 
values  than  by  the  economic  reality  of  the  agricultural  sector,  since 
agricultural  policy  protected  farmers  from  foreign  competition.  One 
example  was  that  the  financial  rewards  of  ownership  were  restricted  in 
various  ways,  or  heavily  taxed,  compared  with  the  rewards  accorded  to 
patronage  (Hakelius,  2002).  Rewarding  patronage  makes  farmers 
overproduce  but,  as  long  as  the  state  regulated  production  by  means  of 
quotas and promised to buy all overproduction, cooperatives did not have 
to set prices that reflected market supply or demand. These changes explain 
why older farmers emphasize economic solidarity between farmers, while 
younger farmers emphasize that cooperatives should become more market 
oriented  (Hakelius,  1996).  The  ideological  values  that  influenced  the 
agricultural policy were largely the values of the Social Democrats, since 
they were the ruling party for most of the post-war period. One goal of the 
agricultural policy, apart from making the country self-sufficient in food, 
was to ensure that agricultural workers (including farmers) earned incomes 
on  par  with  those  of  industrial  workers  (Lindahl,  2004).  This  view  of 
farmers as more or less workers, not owners of farms and cooperatives, also 
helps  explain  why  the  patronage  role  was  emphasized  more  than  the 
ownership role in cooperatives, resulting in restrictions on how capital was 
returned to the members.  
 
Changing  markets  for  agricultural  cooperatives  are  not  unique  to 
Sweden,  however.  In  western  economies,  cooperatives  facing  changing 
markets,  agricultural  policies,  or  jurisdictional  factors  have  tried  different 
approaches to deal with changing demands (Nilsson et al., 2009). Chaddad 
and  Cook  (2004)  provide  a  typology  of  cooperative  and  hybrid 
arrangements, in which residual rights are sometimes apportioned only to 
members and sometimes to external investors as well. Changing agricultural 
markets may have contributed to the bankruptcy of cooperatives (Fulton & 
Larson, 2009, Fulton & Giannakas 2007), the transition of cooperatives to 
IOFs, or the acquisition of cooperatives by IOFs (Chaddad & Cook, 2007, 
Van  der  Krogt,  Nilsson  &  Høst,  2007).  Still,  many  cooperatives  have 
maintained  a  traditional  organization  with  a  high  degree  of  collectivism   14
(Nilsson et al., 2009). Nilsson and Björklund (2003) discuss collectivism in 
terms of the three relationships of patronage, control, and ownership. In 
patronage, they argue that the collectivism is apparent in the principles of 
equal  treatment  and  transparency,  which  is  rational  for  the  cooperative 
business if its members produce in similar quantities of similar quality. In 
the control relationship, collectivism is evident in the one-member-one-
vote  principle,  regardless  of  the  member’s  amount  of  patronage  of  or 
investment in the cooperative. When the membership is homogeneous in 
terms  of  patronage  and  investment,  this  rule  is  rational,  but  when  the 
membership is heterogeneous it is not. In the ownership relationship, their 
main  argument  is  that,  when  the  cooperative  accumulates  capital  from 
revenues,  unallocated  equity  accumulates,  constituting  the  collective 
ownership  retained  by  many  cooperatives.  In  Swedish  cooperatives, 
unallocated  equity  comprises  roughly  80%  of  equity  (Nilsson,  2002, 
Hakelius  2002).  This  unallocated  equity  is  a  result  of  the  profits  that 
cooperatives have chosen not to return to their individual members.  
 
In cooperatives retaining a high proportion of unallocated equity, it may 
be easier for the managers to execute decisions (Murray, 1983) because the 
members do not feel a strong sense of ownership over money that does not 
pass through their hands. Consequently, managers in cooperatives may use 
covert  accumulation  as  a  strategy  to  finance  the  cooperative’s  business 
(Murray,  1983).  Some  of  the  problems  experienced  by  cooperatives  in 
western  economies  may  be  because  they  have  entered  stage  four  of  the 
typology suggested by Cook (1995), in which the cooperative has become 
so large and heterogeneous that member commitment decreases and leaves 
room  for  agency  problems;  the  cooperative  may  then  restructure,  close 
down,  or  become  an  IOF  to  ameliorate  vaguely  defined  property  right 
problems. Perhaps cooperatives have been forced to adapt to new business 
environments that they are incapable of handling (Nilsson et al., 2009). 
1.2  Outline of the thesis 
 
This thesis comprises two papers, both focusing on the individual in the 
cooperative.  The  first  paper  focuses  on  member  preferences  for  the 
reallocation of equity in the cooperative, members having been asked for 
their responses in their roles as members, owners, and patrons.  
   15
The second paper focuses on how particular elected members, namely, 
directors, can play a bridging role in a cooperative, linking members and 
managers  by  aligning  their  interests  and  building  consensus  to  make  the 
cooperative function properly.  
 
1.3  Limitations of the studies 
There  are  several  limitations  to  the  studies  presented  here.  First,  the 
cooperative studied is a Swedish one operating under Swedish legislation. 
This means that some of its features may not be comparable to those of a 
cooperative operating under a different jurisdiction. Second, both studies 
were initiated when the cooperative was undergoing a major merger. This 
was  intentional,  but  leads  to  the  limitation  that  the  results  may  not  be 
applicable to cooperatives under more stable conditions. Third, both studies 
examined  only  one  cooperative,  again  making  comparisons  with  other 
cooperatives  difficult.  The  studies  are  thus  snapshots  of  a  particular 
cooperative  during  a  transition  phase,  revealing  details  that  may  not  be 
visible at other times.  
   16
   17
2  Definitions and theoretical framework 
2.1  What is a cooperative? 
 
Discussions of what constitutes a cooperative often start with the “Rochdale 
pioneers,” a group of British workers in the weaving industry who formed 
a consumer cooperative in 1844 (Barton, 2000). These pioneers established 
guidelines that have in various versions come to be known as the Rochdale 
principles.  One  summary  of  the  guidelines  states  that  a  cooperative  is 
characterized by 
 
1) democratic control; 2) freedom for new members to join; 3) payment 
of  limited  interest  on  capital;  4)  distribution  of  the  surplus  among  the 
members in proportion to their purchases; 5) cash trading; 6) purity and 
quality of the products; 7) education of the members; and 8) political and 
religious neutrality. Two further principles were added at a later date: 9) sale 
at market price and 10) voluntary membership. (Craig, 1993, p. 32) 
 
These guidelines have influenced many definitions of what a cooperative 
is.  The  International  Cooperative  Alliance,  for  example,  refers  to  their 
principles as a modernized and revised version of the Rochdale principles. 
In 1984, Sexton wrote in his doctoral thesis that there was no common 
definition of what constitutes a cooperative, which has led to confusion in 
research  into  cooperatives.  One  reason  for  this  is  that  different  scholars 
emphasize different parts of the guidelines. For example, while one scholar 
might consider democratic control the key feature setting cooperatives apart 
from  investor-owned  firms,  others  stress  limited  returns  to  capital  or   18
something else as “the” distinguishing feature. A definition formulated by 
an economist might well resemble the following: 
 
A cooperative will be defined throughout this dissertation as a firm that 
operates under the modern interpretation of the Rochdale principles, that 
is, member-patron ownership, member-patron control, operation at cost, 
limited  returns  on  invested  capital,  and,  often,  the  duty  to  educate 
membership. (Condon, 1990) 
 
However, not only economists study cooperatives, but other types of 
scholars  do  as  well.  A  sociologist  has  defined  a  workers’  cooperative  as 
follows:  a)  the  establishment  is  autonomous;  b)  employees  can  become 
members  of  the  enterprise  by  means  of  nominal  share  holdings;  c)  one 
member-one  vote;  d)  members  can  participate  in  decision  making  at  all 
levels of the enterprise; and e) members share in profits (Stryjan, 1989). As 
can  be  seen  from  these  two  definitions,  the  two  scholars  are  not  really 
talking about the same thing.  
 
However, in 1987, the USDA formulated a definition that has become 
widely used among economists researching cooperatives: 
 
A  cooperative  is  a  user-owned  and  controlled  business  from  which 
benefits are derived and distributed equitably on the basis of use.  
 
Three  fundamental  principles  for  the  cooperative  enterprise  are 
identified: 
 
The  user-owner  principle:  The  people  who  own  and  finance  the 
cooperative are those that use the cooperative. 
 
The user-control principle: The people who control the cooperative are 
those that use the cooperative. 
 
The user-benefits principle: The cooperative’s sole purpose is to provide 
and distribute benefits to its users on the basis of their use. (USDA 1987, as 
quoted in Barton, 2000) 
 
This definition is often shortened to say that a cooperative is a user-
owned, user-benefiting, and user-controlled business (see, e.g., Österberg & 
Nilsson, 2009). This short version has gained many supporters, and will be   19
used here. However, many non-scholars, as well as non-economists, would 
not call an organization a cooperative without emphasizing such things as 
the  one-member-one-vote  principle,  free  entry  for  new  members,  and 
social responsibility, making it important to specify the definitions used.  
 
It should also be mentioned that, although the Rochdale guidelines have 
been  very  influential,  another  cooperative  school  has  had  an  enormous 
impact  on  European  cooperatives,  namely,  that  of  the  Raiffeisen 
cooperatives. Wilhelm Friedrich Raiffeisen established a list of cooperative 
principles that has influenced legislation on cooperatives in several European 
countries (Nilsson, 2000). The basic features of his principles are as follows: 
1) cooperatives should be so small that you can see the whole membership 
from a church spire; 2) cooperatives are founded to help small, independent 
farmers, but should be open to even the poorest farmers; 3) there should be 
no entrance fees, no or very low business share prices, and no dividends; 4) 
the  liability  of  member  farmers  in  case  of  bankruptcy  is  unlimited;  5) 
administrative tasks are divided among members appointed to a committee; 
6)  loans  have  a  very  short  period  of  notice;  7)  cooperatives  should  be 
multipurpose  ventures;  and  8)  profits  from  the  business  should  go  to  a 
charitable fund (Prinz, 2002). These principles sometimes confuse discussion 
of what actually constitutes a cooperative, and cause some cooperatives to 
engage in practices that are economically self-defeating.  
 
In addition, there are various ways of viewing the relationship between 
cooperatives  and  their  members.  In  their  review  of  performance 
measurement  in  cooperatives,  Soboh  et  al.  (2009)  distinguish  between 
studies that view the cooperative as a nexus of contracts, as an independent 
business, and as a vertically integrated firm.  
 
2.2  Cooperatives and the agricultural sector 
In understanding why farms are often family based, that is, why farms 
have  often  not  evolved  into  large  specialized  corporations,  it  must  be 
realized that the seasonality of crop or livestock farming restricts the natural 
stages of production (Allen & Lueck, 2005). As a result, economies of scale 
cannot be realized in many cases, as the costs of monitoring hired labor 
would  be  too  high  (Hansmann,  1996,  p.  47).  By  running  farming  as  a 
family business, the reduction of moral hazard in hiring employees exceeds 
the gains accrued by a specialization of production (Allen & Lueck, 2005).   20
However, this also means that the primary producers are quite small and 
have little bargaining power versus the purchasers of agricultural products. 
Some crops, such as fruits and vegetables, are perishable and lose value soon 
after production (i.e., described as temporal asset specificity in transaction 
economics),  leaving  farmers  in  a  vulnerable  position (Cook, 2000). One 
solution would be to form a bargaining cooperative with other farmers in 
the  same  situation.  Cooperatives  are  especially  good  at  dealing  with 
opportunistic  behavior  when  there  are  fixed  assets  on  both  sides  of  the 
transaction (Ollila, 1989), such as in dairy production. Another problem for 
farmers  is  that  buyers,  generally  fewer  in  number  than  the  farmers,  can 
more easily form cartels to hold prices down, meaning that farmers receive 
unfavorable  prices.  A  cooperative  could  be  a  solution  here  as  well, 
functioning as a yardstick for other firms (Schrader, 2000; Nourse, 1922). 
Furthermore, much of the agricultural production is subject to the holdup 
problem, meaning that there will be underinvestment due to fear that the 
buyer  will  act  opportunistically  and  acquire  the  quasi-rents  of  the 
production (Klein et al., 1978). By coordinating farmers in cooperatives and 
integrating  vertically,  rents  can  be  safeguarded  against  (Klein,  2005).  In 
some cases, the primary agricultural product does not generate any profit 
but, if the primary producers form a cooperative, they can capture the profit 
generated in the vertically integrated processing industry. Cooperatives in 
the agricultural sector take many forms, but can be broadly divided into the 
following  categories:  bargaining  cooperatives,  which  bargain  on  behalf  of  a 
number of producers to obtain the best possible price; marketing cooperatives, 
which market the products that members produce to expand the market 
and raise prices; processing cooperatives, which aggregate primary products and 
process  them,  and  often  markets  the  products  as  well;  supply cooperatives, 
which ensure that members obtain the inputs they need when they need 
them; and service cooperatives, which are often credit unions or utility unions 
providing services to their members.  
 
2.3  New institutional economics and cooperatives 
 
Neoclassical theory has been criticized for treating the firm as a black box, 
an approach that does not help us understand the existence of cooperatives. 
New  institutional  economics  (NIE)  theory  offers  tools  for  analyzing  the 
intra-organizational  aspects  of  cooperatives,  as  one  premise  of  NIE  is 
bounded rationality, i.e., people are rational but only to a limited extent   21
(Simon, 1945). NIE also abandons the neoclassical economics assumptions 
of perfect information and costless, immediate transactions, instead assuming 
that transactions are costly because individuals have limited information and 
mental  capacity,  making  them  uncertain  of  future  events  and  outcomes 
(Ménard  &  Shirley,  2005).  In  the  case  of  cooperatives,  transaction  cost 
economics (TCE) theory proposes asset specificity as an explanation of why 
cooperatives are sometimes a better solution than IOFs are (Staatz, 1984).  
 
 
2.3.1  Trust and cooperatives in the context of transaction cost economics 
One  direction  in  NIE  is  transaction  cost  economics  (TCE)  theory, 
which  assumes  that  transactions  have  costs,  acting  as  friction  in  the 
economic  system.  If  the  friction  is  too  high,  there  will  not  be  any 
transactions. Adapted to cooperatives, TCE theory explains the existence of 
cooperatives, since they can solve the problems of asset specificity, reduce 
uncertainty, and deal with negative externalities that others can impose on 
farmers. It may also be more efficient for farmers to integrate downstream 
than for an investor-owned firm to integrate upstream (Staatz, 1984). TCE 
theory also helps us understand why trust is crucial to cooperatives: a high 
level of trust in an organization may reduce transaction costs by reducing 
costs in general (Hansmann, 1996). Borgen (2001) has demonstrated that, 
when members identify themselves with the cooperative, this generates trust 
in  the  cooperative.  A  few  studies  have  found  higher  levels  of  trust  in 
cooperatives than in IOFs (Casadesus-Masanell & Khanna, 2003; James & 
Sykuta,  2006).  Trust  among  members  and  between  members  and 
management  teams  has  been    demonstrated  to  predict  group  cohesion, 
which  in  turn  measures  the  commitment  members  have  to  their 
cooperatives (Hansen et al., 2002).  
 
There are multiple definitions of trust (Wilson, 2000); one commonly 
used definition is that “trust is the extent to which one believes that others 
will not act to exploit one’s vulnerability” (Hansen et al., 2002; Morrow et 
al.,  2004).  Trust  has  both  cognitive  and  emotional  (i.e.,  affective) 
dimensions (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). In their explorative study, Hansen et 
al.  (2002)  demonstrate  that  both  types  exist  in  the  two  marketing 
cooperatives  they  examined.  They  suggest  that  in  complex  cooperatives 
members have more reason to monitor management, leading to cognitive 
trust  being  more  important  than  affective  trust  in  such  cooperatives. 
Morrow et al. (2004) build and test a model of affective and cognitive trust   22
in cooperatives. For Swedish cooperatives, it has been suggested that older 
farmers  exhibit  less  trust  in  cooperative  boards  than  do  younger  farmers 
(Österberg & Nilsson, 2009). The authors interpret this lower trust on the 
part of older members as due to the weaker performance of cooperatives 
today than when Sweden had its own agricultural policy. The authors also 
believe  that  older  members  may  be  less  willing  to  accept  new  business 
practices;  when  such  practices  are  introduced,  older  members  hold  the 
board accountable for them.  
 
 
Table 1 Components of trust 
Cognitive trust  Affective trust 
  High  Low  Virtually absent 
High  Ideological trust  Cognitive trust  Rational prediction 
Low  Emotional trust  Mundane, routine 
trust 
Probable anticipation 
Virtually absent  Faith  Fate  Uncertainty, panic 
Source: Lewis and Wiegert (1985) 
 
Related to the concept of trust is member commitment, which can be 
applied to the patron, investor, and member roles (Österberg & Nilsson, 
2009). It is conditional, meaning that members will stay committed to their 
cooperative as long as they believe it is genuinely acting in their interest 
(Fulton  &  Giannakas,  2001).  The  financial  problems  that  have  troubled 
some large western cooperatives seem to be linked to a decline in member 
commitment, which in turn results in poor decision making by managers 
(Fulton & Giannakas, 2007).  
 
 
2.3.2  Agency theory applied to cooperatives 
Agency  theory  (Jensen  &  Meckling,  1976)  offers  explanations  of  the 
relationship  between  cooperative  members  as  agents and the cooperative 
principals (Vitaliano, 1983, Murray, 1983
1). Studies using this approach have 
pointed out that cooperative boards, which consist mostly of members and 
seldom have external directors, often have a strong position in the short-
term  dealings  of  the  cooperative,  since  these  are  close  to  their  ordinary 
                                                 
1  Murray  actually  uses  the  term  “officials”  in  his  analysis  of  British  cooperatives,  as  he 
includes both managers and directors. This is rather unfortunate, since his reasoning on 
covert accumulation would fit well with agency theory.    23
dealings  as  farmers,  but  that  these  directors  may  have  a  weaker position 
when  it  comes  to  long-term  investments  (Murray,  1983.  In  Swedish 
cooperatives, as in all firms, employees are always represented on the board. 
Fulton and Larson (2009) point out that there are several principal–agent 
relationships in a cooperative, members being the ultimate principals and 
board members their agents. However, board members are also principals in 
their relationships with senior cooperative managers. In their study of the 
financial failure of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, they recognize that, as the 
cooperative changed its financing structure by introducing external investors 
and  board  members,  neither  farmers  nor investors had any incentives to 
monitor  management  activities.  In  a  model  developed  to  explore  how 
producers  with  different  degrees  of  productivity  sell  their  products  to  a 
downstream  processor  in  the  form  of  either  an  IOF  or  a  cooperative, 
Bontems  and  Fulton  (2009)  demonstrate  that  goal  alignment  between 




2.3.3  Property rights approaches in cooperative research 
Another productive approach to analyzing cooperatives is the property 
rights approach, adapted to cooperatives via the concept of vaguely defined 
property rights (VDPRs). VDPR problems can increase in cooperatives that 
have become too complex for their members to grasp, and include the free-
rider,  horizon,  portfolio,  control,  and  influence  cost  problems  (Cook, 
1995). Free-rider problems in cooperatives can be both internal and external. 
One  example  of  an  internal  free-rider  problem  is  when  new  members 
immediately  gain  access  to  benefits,  thereby  diluting  the  value  of  these 
benefits  to  previous  members.  External  free-rider  problems  occur  when 
non-members  benefit  from  the  mere  existence  of  the  cooperative.  The 
horizon  problem  occurs  when  the  timeframe  for  returns  generated  by  an 
investment exceeds membership duration, making members hesitant to let 
the cooperative invest in projects that have a longer planning horizon than 
they do themselves. This could lead to underinvestment in the cooperative. 
Some studies have questioned whether the horizon problem could really 
arise in cooperatives. Olesen (2007), for example, demonstrates that, if there 
is a horizon problem in cooperatives, it causes overinvestment rather than 
underinvestment, while Fahlbeck (2007) finds no support for any horizon 
problem in his study. Portfolio problems are common, since members have 
little chance to adjust the cooperative asset portfolio to their personal risk   24
preferences. Members sometimes see investment in a cooperative as a risk-
reduction strategy if investments in their own operations are more risky. In 
cooperatives that handle several different products, cross-subsidization may 
create conflict in the absence of separate capital pools. Hendrikse and Smit 
(2008)  model  the  product  portfolio  choices  of  cooperatives  versus 
corporations,  which  may  somewhat  reflect  the  differences  between 
cooperative  members  as  owners  and  external  investors  as  owners.  This 
highlights the fact that portfolio problems in a cooperative can be multiple. 
First,  each  member  has  to  decide  whether  to  invest  in  the  cooperative, 
whether  the  capital  would  be  of  better  use  in  the  farm  operation,  or 
whether it would pay even better to invest the capital elsewhere. Second, 
the cooperative has to make product portfolio choices, weighing the various 
interests of individual members against the interests of the cooperative as a 
whole.  Control  problems  in  cooperatives  are  essentially  principal–agent 
problems, i.e., it may be difficult for members of a cooperative to monitor 
and control management actions. Finally, influence cost problems occur when 
members  of  the  cooperative  try  to  influence  the  decisions  of  the 
cooperative, thus incurring costs to the cooperative, partly because of the 
activities taking place and partly because ineffective decisions are made. The 
problem is more severe in multipurpose cooperatives, where there is greater 
member  heterogeneity.  Influence  cost  problems  are  more  common  if 
members have no real opportunity to exit the cooperative, i.e., when no 
competing cooperatives or investor-owned firms are available. A study of a 
Norwegian meat cooperative demonstrates that economic factors are what 
count in member perceptions of whether they have any influence in the 
cooperative, but that member age did not matter (Gripsrud et al., 2000). 
Iliopoulos and Hendrikse (2008) find that influence cost problems are lower 
in cooperatives where management is well paid and powerful, but that they 
increase where members have heterogeneous preferences, average member 
age is high, or the cooperative operates several product lines. The horizon 
problem is treated as a special case of influence cost problem in their study. 
The heterogeneous preferences they define include differences in volume 
and  quality  delivered,  geographical  differences,  age  differences,  and  the 
impact  these  have  when  overall  costs  are  calculated  for  the  various 
members.  
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3  Empirical Models and Methods 
Because the underlying interest of the studies constituting this thesis was 
response to institutional change, i.e., change in member relationships with 
the  cooperative,  both  studies  used  an  explorative  approach.  In  the  first 
paper, which was interested in how stakeholders understood the merger, a 
qualitative approach was deemed more useful, especially since mergers are 
infrequent  in  the  daily  lives  of  members/cooperatives.  An  interview 
approach was chosen for that study, in which content analysis could be used 
to  generate  a  better  understanding  of  what  was  happening  in  the 
relationships between the members, member representatives, and managers 
of the cooperative. In the second paper, which examined reactions to an 
equity reallocation, a quantitative approach was chosen because: a) many of 
the  statements  included  in  the  study  refer  to  recurring  events  in  the 
relationship  between  members  and  the  cooperative,  i.e.,  statements  on 
interest on invested capital, dividends, refunds, and other financial activities 
that cooperatives declare to members in their annual statements; and b) the 
study  was  interested  in  determining  whether  responses  differed  due  to 
heterogeneity  in  background  variables,  which  meant  that  a  quantitative 
approach was more suitable.  
 
3.1  Qualitative method 
3.1.1  Semi-standardized interviews and categorization of responses 
For the first study, an interview methodology was chosen. The interviews 
should preferably have been conducted face-to-face, since facial expressions 
and body language are parts of communication that get lost in telephone 
interviews  (Berg,  2009,  p.  122).  There  are  several  disadvantages  to   26
telephone  interviews:  some  potential  respondents  screen  incoming  calls, 
avoiding numbers they do not recognizes, and some potential respondents 
have unlisted numbers, making them difficult to reach (Berg, 2009, p. 123). 
However, two circumstances made telephone interviews the best solution. 
First, the respondents lived quite far apart and it would have been too time 
consuming and costly to visit them at their farms or workplaces. Second, 
the  interviews  were  conducted  in  the  spring,  meaning  that  not  all 
respondents had unlimited time to participate in a study. For those reasons, 
telephone interviews were deemed the best way to gather the information.  
 
The interviews were semi-standardized, meaning they were somewhere 
between  the  standardized  interview,  in  which  respondents  are  asked 
questions  in  the  exact  same  way  and  order,  and  the  unstandardized 
interview, in which interviewers start with the assumption that they do not 
know the questions, since they have not yet started the interview (Berg, 
2009).  The  semi-standardized  interview  offers  the  advantage  of 
predetermining  themes  and  most  of  the  questions,  so  that  interviewee 
responses can be compared, while allowing for follow-up questions from 
the interviewer; it gives the interviewer time to rearrange questions during 
the interview and adapt the language to suit the respondent. This helps the 
interviewer obtain more information from the respondent by adapting the 
interview to the situation. 
 
When analyzing the transcribed interviews, content analysis was used, 
which is essentially “a careful, detailed, systematic examination and interpretation 
of a particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, themes, biases, and 
meanings” (Berg, 2009, p. 338). In content analysis, several approaches can 
be used. For this study, I chose an interpretative approach in which social 
actions and human activity can be inferred from transcribed texts that the 
researcher can analyze. One way to do this is to count elements in the text, 
which  may  explain  why  there  is  debate  as  to  whether  content  analysis 
should be considered a qualitative or quantitative method (Berg, 2009). In 
the  study  in  the  first  paper,  the  interviews  were  subject  to  deductive 
categorization (Kvale, 1997; Saunders et al., 2003), after which the themes 
present in the categories were counted.  
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3.2  Multivariate method 
For  the  second  study,  of  reallocations  of  equity  in  a  cooperative,  a 
multivariate method was chosen. Members of a cooperative completed a 
questionnaire  to  provide  information  regarding  expectations  concerning 
reallocations of equity, the ease with which managers make independent 
decisions  in  the  cooperative,  and  expectations  concerning  the  views  of 
cooperative members. Responses to statements were scored using a five-
point  semantic  scale.  The  statements  in  the  questionnaire  had  been 
developed  from  three  propositions  concerning  how  respondents  were 
thought to respond. 
 
The  relationships  examined  were  of  a  dependent  type,  with  several 
dependent  variables  in  a  single  relationship,  in  which  the  variables  were 
non-metric. According to Hair et al (2010, p. 12), a canonical correlation 
analysis with dummy variables is the most suitable method for analyzing 
such data. Before the canonical correlation analysis was performed, factor 
analysis was performed to reduce the data (Hair, 2010, p. 99).  
3.2.1  Factor analysis 
According to Hair (2010), the primary purpose of factor analysis is “to 
define the underlying structure among the variables in the analysis” (p. 94). 
Factor analysis finds the variables that are highly correlated, reducing them 
to  a  single  variable.  Data  reduction  allows  for  easier  analysis.  It  is  the 
researcher’s responsibility to ensure that the variables grouped into a factor 
fit together and that the factor is valid. The method could be used either as 
a  confirmatory  tool,  which  it  is  hoped  will  confirm  the  predetermined 
factors, or as an exploratory method for finding underlying patterns among 
the variables. In this case, the factor analysis was used in an exploratory way. 
After the factor analysis was carried out, omitting variables that turned out 
not to load, an oblique rotation was performed. Rotation is done because it 
almost always improves the interpretation of the factor solution. In this case, 
an oblique rotation was carried out, that is, a rotation that allows factors to 
be correlated instead of totally independent (Hair, 2010, p. 116). 
3.2.2  Canonical correlation analysis 
A canonical correlation analysis allows the study of two sets of variables 
and the linear relationship between these two sets.  
 
A canonical correlation analysis was chosen because the categories to be 
tested  against  each  other  had  not  been  predetermined.  The  canonical   28
correlation method allows both metric and non-metric variables to be tested 
simultaneously, and places few restrictions on the data analyzed (Hair, 2010, 
p.  237).  The  drawbacks  are  that  the  results  may  be  more  difficult  to 
interpret, and that the method is sensitive to changes in the dataset.  
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4  Data and limitations of the data 
 
In  the  second  paper,  the  data  cited  comprise  responses  to  a  written 
survey sent to members of a grain and supply cooperative. The dataset was 
initially compiled for a master’s thesis (Nilsson, 2002); it was subsequently 
used as described due to the realization that a factor analysis and consequent 
canonical correlation analysis could extract more information from the data.  
 
For  the  interview  study,  various  stakeholders  of  the  same  grain  and 
supply  cooperative  were  interviewed.  Originally,  the  interviews  were 
compiled to illustrate the implementation of a new organizational structure 
in the cooperative (Vinge, 2005), but during the analysis it was found that 
what the stakeholders were talking about had much more to do with trust 
building in the cooperative. The interviews were then reanalyzed in light of 
this new focus. The strength of the interviews is that they were carried out 
immediately after a merger and the implementation of a new organizational 
structure; this timing was opportune, as there was a higher incidence of 
conflicting  interests  and  unresolved  issues  testing  the  trust  between 
stakeholders and within the organization at this time. The interview results 
indicated that this period provided ample material representative of the trust 
building processes of interest. For that very reason, it was impossible to go 
back to the members and conduct additional interviews when it was found 
that there was a lack of interviews with one group of stakeholders in the 
cooperative, which was of course a drawback. However, it was decided that 
the results of the study were informative, even though one group was not 
satisfactorily covered.    30
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5  Results 
In the following studies, the theories presented have been used in exploring 
cooperatives subject to institutional change. Both studies examined the same 
cooperative at a time when the newly merged cooperative had transformed 
from a more federated structure into a national multipurpose cooperative. 
The first study explores how members of this cooperative view investment 
issues,  in  light  of  a  jurisdictional  change  allowing  for  a  reallocation  of 
equity.  The  second  study  explores  how trust between the members and 
managers  of  a  newly  merged  cooperative  may  be  mediated  by  board 
members, especially when a new organizational structure is implemented in 
the cooperative.  
5.1  Trust in merging cooperatives 
 
The study of how members and managers recognize the work of member 
representatives  in  a  newly  merged  cooperative  demonstrates  that  these 
representatives play a mediating role between members and managers. Both 
opinion  making  and  consensus  building  go  on  in  cooperatives,  and 
representatives  initiate  these  processes.  Representatives  can  also  execute 
leadership authority, which serves as a proxy for trust in the cooperative. 
The study concludes that representatives at various levels of a cooperative 
undergoing major changes help maintain trust between the various actors in 
the  cooperative  by  smoothing  out  conflicting  interests  and  resolving 
misunderstandings.  
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5.1.1  Specific contribution of the study 
This study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the importance 
of  member  representatives  in  cooperatives  at  a  time  marked  by  major 
changes in both the cooperative and the agricultural sector at large.  
5.2  Reallocation of equity in cooperatives 
 
The study of how members in a cooperative would react to reallocations of 
equity  found  that  the  planning  horizon  and  level  of  investment  of  each 
member influenced how the respondent experienced economic rationality, 
cooperative  values,  and  internal  free-rider  problems  in  the  cooperative. 
Members with high levels of investment in the cooperative were found to 
be  more  economically  rational  than  were  members  with  low  levels  of 
investment. The most striking finding was that members with high levels of 
investment  were  also  reluctant  to  accept  new  members  or  increased 
patronage.  This  finding  indicates  that  members  with  a  high  level  of 
investment in the cooperative recognize internal free-rider problems. They 
may perceive that the acceptance of new members and increased patronage 
would affect their benefits from the cooperative, as the possible reallocation 
would  be  diluted.  However,  it  was  not  found  that  other  forms  of 
heterogeneity, such as differences in patronage, age, or production among 
members, influenced their preferences regarding equity reallocation.  
 
5.2.1  Specific contribution of the study 
Paper II contributes to the literature by demonstrating that the level of 
investment  made  by  members  of  a  cooperative  influences  how  they 
perceive  newcomers  to  a  cooperative.  Members  with  a  high  level  of 
investment are not as positive toward newcomers as are members with a 
lower  level  of  investment,  indicating  that  members  with  high  levels  of 
investment perceive internal free-rider problems differently than members 
with lower levels of patronage.  
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6  Conclusions 
 
The study of equity reallocations in a cooperative concludes that, in this 
cooperative,  there  was  a  considerable  difference  in  preferences  between 
members with a high level of investment and members with a high level of 
patronage.  Members  with  a  high  level  of  investment  have  a  sense  of 
ownership  in  the  cooperative,  and  would  prefer  not  to  divide  their 
investments with internal free-riders in the form of new, non-contributing 
members. Interestingly, one group of members of the cooperative displayed 
strong  ownership  preferences,  even  though  such  issues  had  not  been 
emphasized for many years. This was also interesting given that the levels of 
individual investment were generally very low, since most of the equity was 
unallocated.  That  members  with  a  strong  owner  orientation  perceived 
newcomers  as  free-riders  was  an  unexpected  but  important  result.  This 
finding should lead cooperatives to analyze more thoroughly how profits are 
distributed to members.  
 
The study of trust in the cooperative concludes that, during a transition 
period,  member  representatives  play  an  important  role  in  bridging 
information  asymmetries  and  aligning  the  interests  of  the  members, 
cooperative, and managers. For a cooperative undergoing such a transition, 
face-to-face communication between the involved parties seems to be more 
effective  than  relying  on  written  communication.  That  managers  attend 
meetings organized by member representatives, instead of organizing their 
own,  indicates  that  the  leadership  authority  retained  by  member 
representatives plays a vital role in ensuring that members actually listen to 
what managers want to say. Without the member representatives, members 
are doubtful and critical of the information given by managers.    34
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7  Further Research 
 
First, the reallocation issue was researched in a cooperative in which the 
patron role has been emphasized, and in which members could be both 
sellers  and  buyers  of  the  same  products.  For  comparison,  it  would  be 
interesting to study a forest cooperative. Transactions between members and 
the  cooperative  in  forest  cooperatives  are  not  nearly  as  frequent  as  in 
agricultural  cooperatives,  so  the  ownership  role  of  members  might  be 
emphasized much more than the patron role. In forest cooperatives, there is 
also  considerable  heterogeneity  among  members.  When  the  forest 
cooperatives were first formed, members lived on their properties in the 
forested areas; nowadays, one third of the members of forest cooperatives 
live outside the areas where the cooperatives operate, meaning that these 
non-residents  have  less  access  to  the  meetings  and  informal  connections 
than  do  local  residents.  It  would  be  interesting  to  study  whether  this 
heterogeneity  influences  member  roles  in  such  cooperatives,  as  well  as 
whether the frequency of transactions with the cooperative influences how 
members view their cooperatives. 
 
Another  interesting  study  would  be  an  analysis  of  influence  and 
interlocking  relationships  among  cooperatives.  Most  cooperatives  in  the 
agricultural sector are enrolled in the major special interest organization for 
the  Swedish  agriculture  sector,  Lantbrukarnas  Riksförbund  (LRF).  The 
board  members  of  some  cooperatives  even  accept  assignments  in  several 
cooperatives,  and  the  same  consultants  may  serve  several  agricultural 
cooperatives. In the case of equity reallocation, it was quite obvious that 
one particular cooperative was the driving force behind implementing the 
jurisdictional  change  allowing  such  reallocations;  preliminary  analysis 
suggests  that  the  remaining  cooperatives  were  influenced  by  that   36
cooperative. It would be interesting to trace whether there was a greater 
emphasis on the ownership role in agricultural cooperatives following the 
1996 jurisdictional change, and whether cooperatives were influenced by 
each other in this.  
 
Finally, I have a suggestion for a study of newly started cooperatives. In 
the Swedish agricultural sector, many of the large cooperatives have faced 
great obstacles and in some cases outright failure since entrance into the 
European market. At the same time, new cooperatives are forming in other 
areas, such as wind power generation, small-scale food processing, and social 
cooperatives.  A  similar  development  has  happened  in  other  western 
countries,  sometimes  resulting  in  the  formation  of  “new  generation 
cooperatives.” It would be informative to examine whether the new, small-
scale  cooperatives  share  any  traits  with  the  American  new  generation 
cooperatives, or whether these newly started cooperatives, unlike the old 
ones, have made any changes in their statutes, taking the vaguely defined 
property rights into account.    37
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